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Abstract
Actuality works in a medial dimension, in which the real only expresses itself, with-
out referencing anything else. That of medium is a spurious space, loaded with cognitive 
and libidinal stains that the subjects leave behind in their relationships. Politics, in the 
neoliberal period, wears itself out in this context that has no links with stable facts, that 
is not shielded from human affairs. Starting from some of Hannah Arendt’s consider-
ations about the relational character of truth, it is possible to think of political praxis in 
this rigorously post-foundational context. With Jacques Rancière, we will then observe 
how the real, in order to be thought, needs to be turned into fiction: politics is a dispute 
about fiction of the common space, about how its material and symbolic configuration 
is imagined. But faking equality of anyone with everyone means in fact practicing it.
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Resumen 
La actualidad se desarrolla en una dimensión medial, en la cual, es decir, lo real 
expresa sí mismo, sin referirse a nada. El del medium es un espacio espurio, opacado 
por las incrustaciones cognitivas y libidinales que los sujetos dejan en sus relaciones. 
La política, en la fase neoliberal, se consuma totalmente en este contexto que no tiene 
conexiones con hechos que sean estables, separados de las vicisitudes humanas. A partir 
de algunas de las reflexiones de Hannah Arendt sobre el carácter relacional de la verdad, 
es posible pensar en la praxis política en este contexto estrictamente post-fundacional. 
Con Jacques Rancière, luego, se verá que lo real, para ser pensado, se tiene que facer 
ficción: la política es una disputa sobre la ficción del espacio común, sobre cómo se 
imagina su configuración material y simbólica. Pero fingir la igualdad de cada uno con 
todos significa practicarla.
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In the introduction to the French edition of his novel Crash (1974), James Ballard 
says:
We live inside an enormous novel. For the writer in particular, it is less and less 
necessary for them to invent the fictional content of their novel. The fiction is 
already there. The writer’s task is to invent the reality.
What could “inventing reality” mean? And most of all, what is the relationship be-
tween this invention, which according to Ballard is the writer’s duty, and politics, which 
is everybody’s duty?
If from a literary, and more broadly aesthetical, standpoint, it is conceded to thread 
with ease through reality and fiction or lie and truth, in politics it is necessary to exer-
cise extreme caution: the principle of reality is often the only thing holding back the 
power’s temptation of manufacturing reality through systematic lying. In her analysis of 
totalitarianism, Arendt stated that the dissolution of the boundary between reality and 
fiction produces the perfect servants, deprived of any political power and any contact 
with their peers and with the world: 
the self-compulsion of ideological thinking ruins all relationships with reality. The 
preparation has succeeded when people have lost contact with their fellow men 
as well as the reality around them; for together with these contacts, men lose the 
capacity of both experience and thought. The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is 
not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the 
distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of experience) and the dis-
tinction between truth and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no longer exist 
(Arendt, 1973, p. 474).
But to us, today it is important to understand how the scenery has changed com-
pared to the age in which Arendt was writing, how the relationship between politics and 
truth presents itself, and verify whether this relationship allows space for a politically 
productive use of fiction. It’s therefore necessary to check what our age has in common 
with what Arendt defined as the “total dominion” and how they differ instead.
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The aestheticization of the scene
Our time and the first decades of the past century share a post-foundational con-
dition (Marchart, 2007). In fact, the whole modernity has acknowledged that being in 
common is built around a void that has to be artificially filled. But while the Hobbesian 
answer was merely formal and nominalistic, meant to make the engine of the State work 
with the complete elimination of any purpose that is external to the system (Good, 
Truth); the late modernity will, instead, bring into play the resources of mimesis. Start-
ing from Hegel, and Romanticism in general, the crisis of the ground is perceived as 
definitive, and in this precise historical phase “un spectre a hanté l’Europe, le spectre 
de l’imitation” (Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, 1991, p. 37). The nation States seek out in 
the ancient times models to replicate – Athens, Sparta, Rome – in order to build their 
identity; but without a past to emulate, Germany (that never knew anything such as the 
Italian Renaissance) adopted, according to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, an eminently 
aesthetical strategy that consisted in the building of a myth, the Aryan myth, as a means 
of identification. That is where fiction comes into play:
le mythe est une fiction en sens fort, en sens actif de façonnement, ou comme le 
dit Platon, de la ‘plastique’: il est donc un fictionnement dont le rôle est de pro-
poser, sinon d’imposer des modèles ou des types […] à l’imitation desquels un 
individu – ou une cité, ou un peuple tout entière – peut se saisit lui-même et 
s’identifier. (p. 34)
In the totalitarian regime, the myth as a mimetic tool produces, far beyond Ben-
jamin’s aestheticization of politics, an actual “fusion de la politique et de l’art, la pro-
duction du politique comme œuvre d’art” (Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, 1991, p. 49). This 
fusion of arts and politics, this hyperbole of mimesis as imposition of a shape, is exactly 
the dissolution of the boundary between reality and fiction, with the related loss of any 
relation between subjects and with a common world, of which Arendt has spoken.
There is undoubtedly a continuity linking our age to the late-modern environment, 
when the germs of the totalitarianism that set Europe on fire in the early twentieth cen-
tury took root. In this sense Foucault (2001b) shows, in a rarely mentioned essay, how 
it was in Jena that the main interests of our age were shaped. We share with the men 
and women of the late nineteenth century the same disillusionment: we are aware of 
working with and within the void. But, as observed in the same essay by Foucault, in Ro-
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manticism the effort to bring the multiple to a coherent synthesis comes to its maximum 
tension, the dispositive of representation cracks and the differences start to leak out. The 
social ontology becomes fragmented and disorganic, there is the shaping of a paradigm 
that first glorifies the individual and then tears down this pretentious atom too.
On one hand, in fact, the romantic subject sees itself as towering, separated from 
the world since it is forced to experience the inability of the universe to accommodate 
the genius consciousness. On the other, the imagination – skill “discovered” by Kant, in 
which Arendt will find a political power – “disgrega l’ordine in una confusione di oggetti 
parziali, spettrali, frammenti, colori, brandelli di realtà” (Bazzicalupo, 2013b). It is Hegel 
who points out
questa produzione di disintegrazione, di destituzione dell’ordine esistente, è un 
nodo, a mio avviso, cruciale. Il gesto negativo dell’immaginazione pre-sinteti-
ca pre-discorsiva distrugge ogni unità (della Realtà, dell’ordine immaginario e 
simbolico) smembra l’esperienza, instaurando le membra disiecta. Emerge un 
soggetto out of joint che coincide con l’immaginazione disordinante: lo dobbi-
amo prendere in carico in luogo di quel Soggetto della tradizione umanistica, 
feticcio fantasmatico che supporta l’ordine della realtà e si subordina agli inter-
essi della vita.
The synthesis of the multiple, the project of which modernity consisted, gets harder 
as the production and proliferation of images do not simply populate the world, they 
make the subject itself. Obviously the spread of imagination will happen at a later time, 
after the tragedy of totalitarianism, and after the victory of liberal democracies. Shout-
ing “Imagination to Power!”, the 1968 will blow up the logic of representation, of the 
reductio ad unum: now alongside the crisis of Keynesianism – which brings the “impos-
sibilità di una sintesi di linguaggio economico e politico” (Bazzicalupo, 2006, p. 106) –, 
the differences start disseminating, “il singolo vivente, attraverso la rivendicazione della 
propria differenza, rivendica la propria concretezza non più sacrificata all’ideale, riven-
dica la corporeità, il corpo proprio che era stato disciplinato e normalizzato nelle reti di 
controllo sociale e morale” (Bazzicalupo, 2013, p. 65). 
In this situation, the representation shatters: “the self-compulsion of ideological 
thinking” Arendt talks about, the manufacturing of a “fictional truth” to encompass the 
subjects, depriving them of any relationships with reality, becomes impossible. In fact, 
Politics now deals not anymore with citizens – legal entities framed in a status – but with 
Massimo Villani  FICTION, TRUTH, POLITICS: THE AESTHETICAL DIMENSION OF ACTUALITY. FROM ARENDT TO RANCIÈRE
SOFT-Taco #12.indd   193 28/05/20   12:11
194
Soft Power          Volumen 6, número 2, julio-diciembre, 2019
living bodies stating their wishes and needs, asserting their imagination. The engineer-
ing of truth, or, which is the same, the lie systematically elevated as reality, can’t measure 
up against the centrifugal force of bodies expressing each its own unique truth. The 
subjects escape the representative cone and establish themselves outside of any fusional 
or sacrificial logic.
This means that truth itself changes status: it is no longer something transcendental, 
impassive about the experiences of the single subjects. On the contrary, the latter are 
themselves bearers of their own truth, they do not refer to anything external, and they 
outline their own unique and singular truth in the world. As perfectly summarised by 
Blanchot – who was able to grasp, not by chance, the idleness of 1968 as mere mani-
festation or manifestativity (1983) – “Je ne représente plus, je suis; je ne signifie plus, je 
présente” (1949, p. 317).
Immagination and mediality
Although quick and lacking, the excursus carried out so far has shown how in cur-
rent social ontology the relationships between truth, lie and politics are such that the 
“ideological” dispositive stigmatised by Arendt (1973, pp. 460-479) will surely no longer 
take a hold. However, it is not licit to draw from this the conclusion that the lie is not a 
danger anymore and that we live in the triumph of truths.
First of all, it should be pointed out that the economical-political system immediate-
ly catches the libidinal push that takes away the subjects from the representative cone. 
Therefore, the productive system does not castrate but rather encourages this differen-
tial exuberance, this narcissism of self-exposure. The new capitalism has absorbed and 
bent to its own ends the most radical concepts expressed during the protests of 1968:
c’est en s’opposant au capitalisme social planifié et encadré par l’État – traité com-
me obsolète, étriqué et contraignant – et en s’adossant à la critique artiste (au-
tonomie et créativité) que le nouvel esprit du capitalisme prend progressivement 
forme à l’issue de la crise des années 60-70” (Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999, p. 313).
What matters the most with regard to our topic is the fact that imagination, whose 
negative aspect we previously mentioned, loses exactly this fundamental political power 
of destroying the existent: of conceiving the given not as a destiny, but rather as a con-
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tingency that can always be altered. “L’immaginario dilagante, annullato ogni interdetto 
edipico, si manifesta nell’ingiunzione superegoica a godere, a autorealizzarsi, a lasciar 
proliferare la libera produzione di fantasie che offrano immediata soddisfazione e godi-
mento” (Bazzicalupo, 2013b). If the imagery is the “surplus libidico che sostiene [ogni] 
assetto di poteri”; today, imagination is no longer able to dismantle such structure, since 
both – imagery and imagination – vanish into the dimension of simulacrum (Baudril-
lard, 1981).
In the age of the world picture, the age in which images propagate without overlap-
ping any original given, but rather building the world itself as pure surface that does not 
refer to anything underneath (Ferari & Nancy, 2002; Nancy, 2002), the exercise of sus-
picion becomes problematic: there is no hidden reality beyond the ideological curtain. 
Modernity has thought emancipation starting from the idea of an original separation: 
the community, separated from itself according to the law of capital, met its own essence 
as something alien to stand up against; the liberation could only be thought in terms of 
a restoration of unity, a reappropriation of the alienated essence. The emancipation was 
the reappropriation of the truth hidden behind the ideological curtain.
It’s hard to still conceive emancipation, politics in general, in these terms, in a world 
that no longer distributes itself according to depth and ulteriority, but according to sur-
face. In the age of constant simulation, the fundamental category seems to be undecid-
ability, that is the impossibility to oppose the fact to the lie. By virtue of all of this, it is 
right to consider, alongside Ferraris, the post-truth as “l’essenza della nostra epoca” (Fer-
raris, 2017, p. 10). Detached from any adherence to facts, and still imposed thanks to the 
“trumpets” (pp. 7-19) of the new media as incontrovertible truths, opinions constitute 
the dimension in which the whole modern politics operate.
Starting from this diagnosis, there are two viable paths. The first aims to rebuild 
ontology to make it the foundation of politics and ethics. According to this perspective, 
it is possible to conceive something like politics or ethics only on the basis of a univocal 
reality, taken away from the arbitrariness of the opinion. This is the very path consis-
tently developed by Ferraris, who has been committed for years to the rebuilding of a 
new realism (Ferraris 2012; 2011; Putnam, 2005). However, it is also possible to think of 
a kind of politics that takes the impossibility of a legislative transcending not as a lim-
itation but rather as a specific resource. In other words, although it is no longer possible 
to perform the unmasking, the tearing of the veil that hides or distorts the facts to make 
the truth emerge, it is still possible to break into the scene and disarticulate the relations 
of power and the effects they produce.
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In the meantime, only incidentally, one could say that the “populist moment” (Cac-
ciatore, 2019) identifies a phase of radical transformation in the political space that, in 
so far as it finds in Laclau its theoretical basis, conceives hegemony as a strategy rather 
than a truth (Bazzicalupo, 2010). The populist logic adjusts itself to the extreme social 
fragmentation which is the premise of the neoliberal scenery, and it does not oppose to 
it an identitary subject responsible of showing the real and coherent movement of his-
tory, but builds a front of antagonism that has rhetorical basis, rather than ontological.
Regardless, it is necessary to acknowledge that in the current neoliberal form – leav-
ing out the question about the end of neoliberalism (Crouch, 2011; Fraser 2017; De 
Carolis 2017) – democracy
con la sua legittimità neutralistica e procedurale lascia vuoto o quasi, lo spazio 
cavo, il trono dell’imperatore assente e sposta la sua invadenza dai luoghi istituz-
ionali del governo al medium, la comunicabilità stessa, esattamente ostruendo, in 
dominio latamente politico, lo spazio che dovrebbe rimanere aperto alla interre-
lazione e alla politica. (Bazzicalupo, 2000, p. 7)
We are in a “medial reality”. The expression is paradoxical, but it shows how there is 
no reality beyond the spurious space – loaded with cognitive and emotional stains that 
cloud the Habermasian communicative action – in which the subjects occur mutually 
to assert their own difference, their singularity. There is no reality beyond the medium 
and the medium is counterfactual. It is not compared to an external referent, but rather, 
as McLuhan stated many years ago, the medium is the message (McLuhan, 1964). The 
political life wears itself off in this aesthetical, medial dimension, in the emotional and 
cognitive surges that arise in this space.
From this perspective, Arendt’s appeal to a substantial, factual reality, which is sep-
arated and independent from human conflicts, appears problematic: “in their stub-
bornness, facts are superior to power; they are less transitory than power formations” 
(Arendt, 1968, p. 259). According the philosopher, truth “possesses a strength of its 
own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a via-
ble substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace 
it” (p. 259). The very idea of replacement suggests that factual truth might be somewhat 
safe, separated from the dimension in which human interactions occur. Arendt con-
cludes, “truth it is the ground on which we stand” (p. 264).
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Great democracy
It is possible to introduce a new theoretical hypothesis starting from cues offered by 
Arendt herself. Starting from the relational character of factual truths. Distinct from 
rational truths, such as logical-mathematical axioms, “facts and events – the invariable 
outcome of men living and acting together” (Arendt, 1968, p. 231) immediately deal 
with an intersubjective space: “factual truth is always related to other people: it concerns 
events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and 
depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it 
occurs in the domain of privacy” (p. 238). It is this truth that, according to Arendt, is 
“political by nature” (p. 238).
This emphasis on the conditional nature of truth overturns the reasoning: in an ex-
quisitely political logic, it’s not the men who stand on the ground of truth, an it is rather 
responsibility of the political actors, not just in terms of its transmission, but its for-
mation as well. In other words, politics exist because there is a narrow space between 
harmful and deceitful manipulation of facts, and the generative shaping of truth: it’s
the very narrow path between the risk of considering them the result of some kind 
of necessary development men could not prevent, and hence can’t do anything 
against it, and the risk of denying them, of trying and manipulating them away 
from the world” (Arendt, 1968, p. 259).
The political action needs to make room for itself between the “coercion of truth” (p. 
246) and that delicate contingency of facts and events “which is the price of freedom” 
(p. 243).
It’s this very space that Rancière tries to explore, firmly proposing a knot between 
politics and fiction. To make this clear, it is necessary a short digression to go back to 
what Rancière consider the historical preconditions – the material a priori – of contem-
porary democracy. In fact, Rancière pinpoints what he calls an “aesthetical revolution” 
happening in Europe at the end of the XVIII century. This revolution wasn’t acknowl-
edged by political theory, or even sought out as a project by political praxis. It is a trans-
formation of subjectivities that concerns their way of being in the world, of perceiving 
themselves and their relationship with their context. In this strong sense this is about 
an “aesthetical” revolution: it’s about the sensation what overwhelms the senses, in the 
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material and symbolic chiasm that constitutes it; it is a transformation of the living 
forms, of the “ways of speaking and acting”, as Rancière frequently says.
Secondarily, it is an aesthetical transformation that, as in the field of arts, reaches 
self-awareness, self-representation. In fact, what from this period onwards will be called 
“art”, in the singular, is a set of practices that become identifiable within a new material 
and symbolic configuration of the common world. In order to define this configuration, 
Rancière refers to the meaning ‘aesthetics’ took on with Hegel, rather than to the one it 
had with Baumgarten and Kant. While the latter regards the field of sensory knowledge 
– an inherently confused knowledge, awaiting to be refined by intellect – with Hegel, 
and generally within the context of Romanticism,
sous le nom d’esthétique, s’opère une identification entre la pensée de l’art – la 
pensée effectuée par les œuvres de l’art – et une certaine idée de la ‘conaissance 
confuse’: (…) non plus une moindre conaissance mais proprement une pensée de 
ce qui ne pense pas” (Rancière, 2001, p. 14).
“Aesthetics' is not, therefore, the sphere that deals with art, but ‘une idée de la pensée 
selon laquelle les choses de l’art sont choses de la pensée’” (p. 12). Thus, it is the develop-
ment of a new artistic regime of identification, one that Rancière calls “aesthetical”, by 
virtue of which the objects of art are identified according to their belonging to a specific 
field of the sensible.
In the previous regime, instead, the “poetic or representative” one was the concept 
of mimesis, the one organising the ways of doing that make a work eligible of being 
considered artistic; but “la mimesis n’est pas la loi qui soumet les arts à la ressemblance. 
Elle est d’abord le pli dans la distribution des manières de faire et des occupations so-
ciales qui rend les arts visibles” (Rancière, 2000, p. 30). This means that some practices 
were acknowledged as artistic within a specific distribution of the sensible which was 
hierarchical and divisive: manual workers are banned from both creative leisure and 
genuine political capability, as they live submerged in the blind dimension of necessity; 
instead, intellectuals are properly active men, as they have a vision of the whole, so they 
are able to conceive common purposes and the means to achieve them. This division of 
humanity is symmetrical to the one establishing itself in the realm of arts: comedy befits 
the humble, tragedy befits aristocrats, and it is tragedy’s duty to represent a rational, no 
longer aleatory, concatenation of events that in their causal order trace a rational struc-
ture, with a beginning, a development, a fulfilled purpose.
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La distinction poétique entre deux types d’enchaînement des événements repose 
sur une distinction entre deux types d’humanité. Le poème, dit Aristote, est un 
agencement d’actions. Mais l’action n’est pas simplement le fait de faire quelque 
chose. C’est une catégorie organisatrice d’un partage hiérarchique du sensible. Sel-
on ce partage, il y a des hommes qui vivent au niveau de la totalité, parce qu’ils 
sont capables de concevoir de grandes fins et de chercher è les réaliser en affron-
tant d’autres volonté et les coups de la fortune. Et il y a les hommes qui simple-
ment voient les choses leur arriver. […] Ceux-là sont appelés hommes passifs ou 
‘mécaniques’, non parce qu’ils ne font rien mais perce qu’ils ne font rien d’autre 
que faire, qu’ils sont exclus de l’ordre des fins qui est celui de l’action. (Rancière, 
2014, p. 22)
At the end of the XVIII century this partition of the sensible collapses, shatter-
ing “la barrière mimétique qui distinguait les manières de faire de l’art des autres 
manières de faire et séparait ses règles de l’ordre des occupations sociales” (Rancière, 
2000, p. 33). The aesthetic regime places all the practices on an only plane and breaks 
down the walls that divide humanity and that assign each one to a specific place, a 
specific role and a proper self-representation. This transformation is the root of our 
democracy as it constitutes “le moment de formation d’une humanité specifique” (p. 
33). These new forms of life tear apart the representative logic because they discover 
“une capacité inédite des hommes et des femmes du peuple à accéder à des formes 
d’expérience qui leur était jusque-là refusées” (Rancière, 2014, p. 20). Anyone is grant-
ed any experience.
Literature acknowledges this revolution “changeant non plus la mécanique de l’État 
et des lois mais les formes sensibles de l’expérience humaine” (Rancière, 2008, p. 12). 
For example, (and Rancière shows this applies to any ‘hero’ of this new literature, from 
Woolf ’s Mrs. Dalloway to Conrad’s adventurers) Emma Bovary is “désireuse de vérifier 
dans sa vie le sens de quelque mots dérobés aux livres destinés aux âmes d’élite (félicité, 
ivresse, passion)” (Rancière, 2014, p. 28), just like the protagonists of the French workers 
movement between 1830 and 1848. As Rancière shows in a remarkable archival research 
(Rancière, 1981), they projected themselves out of the status of “workers”, “proletariat”, 
“laborers”, men whose bodies and minds were shaped by manual labor, who presumably 
are not expected to think. Instead, they devoted their nights, the time reserved for rest, 
to intellectual activities, reading, studying, discussing amongst themselves and with 
their masters, they altered the partition of times, spaces and roles they were destined to, 
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they did not act as workers anymore: to reclaim the rights they are entitled to as work-
ers, they take on an identity that is not the one of workers.
The most important point to our discussion is the rise, within the context of this aes-
thetical transformation, of a new fabric of the sensible in which, any axiological division 
being crumbled, all the entities coexist on the same plane without the possibility of estab-
lishing a normative and organizative principle that would transcend this very plane. Just 
as in the novels of Flaubert, Proust or Woolf, everything is on equal plane, worthless ob-
jects, thoughts, desires, dreams, overwhelming passions, moods, sounds, scents, ethereal 
sensations. Nothing is subjected to anything, everything expresses itself in a scene made of 
mere multiplicity, that in turn does not move forward to a development and a teleological-
ly oriented concatenation of specific actions, but that simply expresses itself. There is only 
one cosmic concatenation keeping together the lives of everyone through “la puissance 
des éléments atmosphériques, les intensités du soleil et du vent et la multiplicité des événe-
ments sensibles dont les cercles s’élargissent è l’infini” (Rancière, 2014, p. 25). Rancière 
uses the expression “grande démocratie” to define this system of sensible coexistences 
“qui revoque l’étroitesse de l’ordre ancien des conséquences causales et des convenances 
narratives et sociales” (p. 26). This paratactic coexistence of all the entities is the a priori of 
democracy as it makes possible to disidentify, to create an interval regarding the place and 
role, the shift of anyone towards any region of being. Rancière defines as “metapolitics” the 
fundamental figure of modern political philosophy that aims to eliminate this egalitarian 
coexistence and reinstate a normative and axiological principle. A discourse of Marxian 
character makes political philosophy “une symptomatologie qui, dans chaque différence 
politique, par exemple celle de l’homme et du citoyen, détecte un signe de non-vérité” 
(Rancière, 1995, pp. 119-120). It’s this very interval that metapolitics aims to remove, fill-
ing it through a reality that it locates in the social:
La méta-politique c’est le discours sur la fausseté de la politique qui vient doubler 
chaque manifestation politique du litige, pour prouver la méconnaissance de sa 
propre vérité en marquant à chaque fois l’écart entre les noms et les choses, l’écart 
entre l’énonciation d’un logos du peuple, de l’homme ou de la citoyenneté et le 
compte qui en est fait, écart révélateur d’une injustice fondamentale, elle-même 
identique à un mensonge constitutif. (p. 119)
According to Rancière, the temptation of removing this interval is the illusion that 
it is possible to restore an allegedly lost unity, eliminate the alienation and erase the 
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improper element in which politics sets itself. The idea of a separation that must be sup-
pressed supports the whole discourse of critical theory: separation between immediate 
experience and truth of the experience itself; separation between the world of appear-
ances, the spectacle maliciously put on by the power, and the truth of this spectacle that 
that stands outside: separation, then, between fiction and reality. In so far as it boosts 
the political productivity of fiction, Rancière’s solution may sound naif, ingenuous. It 
is actually based on the previously mentioned revolution of  “formes sensibles de l’ex-
périence humaine”, a transformation that, when it fully deploys its effects, cannot be 
disregarded today: let’s consider commoditized technologies like Deepfake, augmented 
reality experiences, wearable devices like Google Glasses or more invasive ones that 
promise a perfect symbiosis with the AI (Cuthbertson, 2019; Montani, 2014). All of this 
makes the truth/fiction distinction more difficult. The world of sensible equality is the 
one where emotions, dreams, volitions, desires and ‘things’ coexist on the same plane.
Fiction and truth
The very concept of separation needs to be reconsidered. On one hand, contempo-
rary subjectivations wish to erase that “separation perfected” from which Debord starts, 
in 1967, his analysis on the society of the spectacle (Debord, 1996): they do not want to 
be in front of a performance, they want to be in it, be a part of it. On the other hand, this 
projecting oneself into the “show” does not equate the reappropriation of a previously 
alienated essence; it is not the access to a solid reality beyond the prism of illusion.
In the neoliberal scenery, as previously described, to be inside means to coexist on 
a plane of “simultanéité non coordonnée des choses ou des êtres, la contingence de leur 
coappartenances, la dispersion des profusions d’aspects, d’espèces, de forces, de fomres, 
de tensions et d’intentions” (Nancy, 2011, p. 90). This is how Nancy defines “struction”, 
that is “l’état de l’‘avec’ privé de la valeur de partage, ne mettant en jeu que la simple con-
tiguïté avec sa contingence” (p. 90). Ontology of actuality displays the simple heap, the 
mass, the multiplicity deprived of synthesis, the separation that is necessary to touch, 
the proximity. Not the separation from the alienated essence, but rather the distance 
that allows proximity.
Now, this mere coexisting outside of any shared essence is, for Rancière, what 
makes emancipation possible: “la distance n’est pas un mal à abolir, c’est la condition 
normale de toute communication. Les animaux humains sont des animaux distants 
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qui communiquent à travers la forêt des signes” (Rancière. 2008, p. 16). Emancipa-
tion is not the process that leads men into meeting again in the element of truth. 
On the contrary, it’s anyone’s ability to experience a “dissociation”, the opening of a 
distance from the place and the role they were assigned. An emancipated community, 
Rancière says, it’s not a community ascribing its immanence to an original essence, a 
harmonious community, in which “chacun est à sa place, dans sa classe, occupé à la 
fonction qui lui revient et doté de l’équipement sensible et intellectuel qui convient à 
cette place et à cette fonction” (p. 48). An emancipated community is rather one made 
of “conteurs et de traducteurs”, that is, made of subjectivities that relentlessly produce 
signs, open intervals, separate themselves from any alleged place of election. It’s a 
community that imagines, that gives up the dream of obtaining a proper body beyond 
its own imagination:
congédier les fantasmes du verbe fait chair et du spectateur rendu actif, savoir que 
les mots sont seulement des mots et les spectacles seulement des spectacles peut 
nous aider à mieux comprendre comment les mots et les images, les histoires et les 
performances peuvent changer quelque chose au monde où nous vivons” (p. 29).
In the aesthetical, medial dimension, in which politics sets itself today, rather than 
building a solid ontology to entrust with a universal truth, separated from the ups and 
downs of human affairs, it is perhaps possible to discover the political potential of fic-
tion. On the other hand, it is not the science of truth that is necessarily going to en-
lighten the political praxis: “il n’y a pas d’évidence que la connaissance d’une situation 
entraîne le désir de la changer” (Rancière. 2008, p. 33). Fiction, for Rancière, is not 
lying: “feindre, ce n’est pas proposer des leurres, c’est élaborer des structures intelligi-
bles” (Rancière, 2000, p. 56). In some sens, one can never get out of fiction, as real, in 
the Lacanian sense; to be thought needs to be preliminary woven into a symbolic and 
significant texture:
Le réel doit être fictionné pour être pensé. Cette proposition est à distinguer de 
tout discours – positif ou négatif – selon lequel tout serait ‘récit’, avec des alter-
nances de ‘grands’ et de ‘petits’ récits. La notion de ‘récit’ nous enferme dans les 
oppositions du réel et de l’artifice où se perdent également positivisteset décon-
structionnistes. Il ne s’agit pas de dire que tout est fiction. Il s’agit de constater que 
la fiction de l’âge esthétique a défini des modèles de connexion entre présentation 
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de faits et formes d’intelligibilité qui brouillent la frontière entre raison des faits et 
raison de la fiction, et que ces modes de connexion ont été repris par les historiens 
et par les analystes de la réalité sociale. (p. 61)
Political praxis is therefore a quarrel on fiction: against the logic of (hierarchical and 
divisive) representation one can pit the fiction of the great coexistence putting all enti-
ties (‘real’ or ‘fictional’) on the same plane. But faking equality means in itself practicing 
it. Strangely enough, then, in the knot that ties politics and fiction, there is a politics of 
truth reconnecting Rancière to Foucault (Foucault 2008, 2012): not a universal, onto-
logically anchored truth, but rather a truth that is “testimoniale ed esistenziale, dove 
logos e vita, concetto ed ergon coincidono” (Bazzicalupo, 2016, p. 501). The political 
struggle, in the aesthetic dimension of actuality, plays out on the “effects” (Foucault, 
2001), on the articulation of the symbolic-material framework. To paraphrase Foucault, 
fiction is not made for understanding, it is made for cutting.
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